

The Single Salary Schedule for Teachers in K-12 Public Schools

A Brief Discussion Paper Prepared for
the Center for Reform of School Systems

August 14, 2002

Michael Podgursky
Department of Economics
University of Missouri – Columbia
PodgurskyM@Missouri.edu

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Marcie Spudich in compiling the data on the Houston Independent School District. The usual disclaimers apply.

Introduction

Salary schedules for teachers are a nearly universal feature of public school districts. Pay for teachers in public school districts is largely determined by these schedules. In large school districts the pay of thousands of teachers in hundreds of schools -- from kindergarten up to secondary teachers in math and science -- is set by a single district schedule.

Under a salary schedule pay for teachers is determined by years of experience and the number of graduate coursework completed. In a typical schedule, the rows indicate years of experience and the columns indicate the levels of graduate coursework completed or degrees obtained. For example, Table 1 displays the 2001-2002 salary schedule for the Houston Independent School District.

The nearly universal use of salary schedules in public school districts is seen in Figure 1, where we plot data from the 1999-00 Schools and Staffing Surveys. Ninety six percent of public school districts use a salary schedule for teacher pay (Figure 1). If we weight these responses by the number of students in the district this percentage rises to nearly 100 percent. Note that the percentage of public charter and private schools that report using salary schedules is considerably lower. Analysis of private schools that report use of schedules also finds that experience and graduate credentials explain much less of the variation in teacher pay, suggesting a greater willingness of these schools to go "off schedule" when necessary (Ballou and Podgursky, 1997).

School districts exhibit very wide variation in the number steps on salary schedules, the ratio of BA minimum to MA maximum salaries, and the changes in salary schedule parameters over time (Ballou and Podgursky, 2002; Lankford and Wycoff, 1996; Murnane, Singer, and Willett, 1987). Several studies have found a tendency for districts to "backload" salary increases in favor of incumbent teachers.

These salary schedules for teachers contrast with the situation in most other professions. In medicine, pay of doctors and nurses varies by specialty. Even within the same hospital or HMO, pay will differ by specialty field. In higher education there are large differences in pay between faculty by teaching fields. Faculty pay structures in most higher education institutions are flexible. Starting pay is usually market-driven and institutions will often match counter-offers for more senior faculty whom they wish to retain. Merit or performance-based pay is commonplace. Ballou and Podgursky (1997) and Ballou (2000) report generally similar findings for private K-12 education. Even when private schools report that they use a salary schedule for teacher pay, payments "off schedule" seem commonplace.

Indeed, by comparison with pay determination in teaching even government civil services schedules are more flexible and market-based. Starting pay in the federal GS system reflects market factors. New Ph.D.s in economics or finance will start at higher levels of pay than will Ph.D.'s in other disciplines. Professionals advance through the GS steps within a grade and between grades based on merit as well as experience.

Historical Background

Teacher salary schedules are sometimes referred to as “single salary schedules,” a term reflecting their historical development. Kershaw and McKean (1962) note that historically there were three phases in the development of teacher pay. The first phase, which lasted roughly until the beginning of the 20th century, saw teacher pay negotiated between an individual teacher and a local school board. As school districts consolidated and grew in size this type of salary determination became increasingly unpopular with teachers. With consolidation and growth, the monopoly power of school districts in the labor market increased and charges of favoritism were common. In response to these problems, there was gradual movement toward the use of salary schedules that differed by grade level and position. “Typically the salaries differed from grade to grade, and high school salaries would inevitably be higher than those at the elementary level.” (Kershaw and McKean, 1962, p. 22).

The third phase began in the 1920's and accelerated in WWII and the immediate post-war period. This is characterized by what was termed the “single salary schedule” -- the current norm. An education commentator writing in the 1950's noted that “The distinguishing characteristic of the single salary schedule is that the salary class to which the classroom teacher is assigned depends on the professional qualifications of the teacher rather than the school level or assignment.” Kershaw and McKean write “The single salary schedule was regarded as bringing a feeling of contentment and professionalism. A teacher would no longer be an elementary teacher, but a teacher, a member on equal footing of the profession that included all teachers.” By 1951, 98 percent of urban school districts employed the single salary schedule. (Kershaw and McKean, 1962, pp. 23, 25. See also, Lieberman, 1956, pp. 391-393)

Since elementary school teachers were nearly all women whereas high school teachers were largely male, struggles for a single salary schedule were seen by some commentators as an important part of feminist struggles for pay equity (Murphy, 1990). Eventually, the unification of schedules for elementary and secondary school teachers was embraced by the National Education Association as well as the American Federation of Teachers, who remain strong proponents.

Arguments Pro and Con

From an economic point of view, we can distinguish three rigidities or inefficiencies associated with the single salary schedule. In considering reform of teacher pay it is useful to keep these distinctions in mind.

A. Differences by Field

The single salary schedule suppresses pay differentials by field. Many districts have little difficulty in hiring elementary school teachers but face chronic shortages of

applicants in special education, math, and science. This is illustrated in data from the 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Surveys reported in Table 1. When school administrators (with vacancies) were asked how difficult it was to recruit teachers in various fields, 68 percent reported that it was “easy” to fill their positions in elementary education as compared to just 26 percent of those with vacancies in special education. On the other hand, just six percent of administrators reported that it was very difficult or that they could not fill an elementary education vacancy as compared to 39 percent of those with special education vacancies. As can be seen from the table, the profile for science and math is similar to special education.

Paying all teachers in the district off the same schedule virtually guarantees shortages by field. For most districts it simply is not possible to raise the pay of all teachers to a level sufficient to eliminate shortages in the most difficult-to-recruit areas. Even if this were possible, it would be an extremely costly and inefficient use of resources.

By analogy, consider the situation in higher education. Average pay of faculty varies greatly by field. Finance professors make much higher salaries than history or English professors, nonetheless the former are still difficult to recruit given the high levels of pay that they can command in the private sector. Higher education costs would increase massively if it were necessary to pay all higher education faculty at the same rate as finance professors. Moreover, attempts by higher education institutions to suppress pay gaps between finance and other disciplines would simply cause the market to “clear” in terms of quality rather than price -- the quality of finance faculty would fall relative to that in other disciplines.

B. Differences by Quality of Teaching Performance

The single salary schedule suppresses differentials by effort or quality of teaching. A growing body of research on student achievement gains highlight the large differences in the effectiveness of classroom teachers (Goldhaber, 2002). These differences may arise from differences in effort, training, or natural ability. However, whatever the source of these differences, it is inefficient not to remunerate teachers whose performance is superior. The current salary schedule rewards a teacher who performs poorly at the same rate as a hard-working, highly effective teacher. Hence weak teachers have the same financial incentives to remain employed in the district as do the effective teachers. In fact, weak teachers may have even stronger incentives to stay if their non-teaching alternative earnings are lower. In fact, several studies find that new teachers with higher academic ability as measured by college selectivity or SAT/ACT scores tend to exit the teaching profession at a faster rate (Steinbrickner, 2001; Podgursky, Monroe, Watson, 2002; Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2002).

C. Differences by School.

The single salary schedule suppresses differentials by schools within districts. In medium or large urban districts hundreds of schools will be covered by the same salary

schedule. The working environments for teachers vary greatly between these schools. Some may be dangerous places to work. Children will be less well-behaved and present many classroom challenges. By contrast, other schools will be more pleasant places to work. Often teachers in these districts will be able to use their seniority to transfer from a less pleasant to a more pleasant school. Or they may simply quit the profession entirely or take jobs in districts with more attractive schools. In either case the result is that students in the less desirable high-poverty schools on average will have teachers who have less seniority and education.

One ironic result of "equity" in teacher pay within the district is inequity in per pupil expenditures. Because their teachers have less seniority and fewer graduate credits, the average teacher pay, and thus expenditure per pupil, will tend to be lower in high poverty schools. Of course some of this inequity will be "fixed" by compensatory programs such as Title I that favor high poverty schools.

In general, if there is considerable variation in the attractiveness of working conditions between schools in a district and pay is equalized then teacher quality will not be equalized. In such circumstances, if district administrators wish to equalize teacher quality then they will need to disequalize teacher pay.

Data from the Houston Independent School District in Figure 2 illustrate this point. I choose HISD not to pick on a particular district, but rather to illustrate this very general phenomenon. Almost any urban district will tend to display this pattern. Here I display a scattergram showing the percent of teachers with five or fewer years experience against the percent of students who are free or reduced lunch eligible for 178 elementary schools in the Houston Elementary School District. The fitted line reflects a statistically-significant positive relationship between student poverty and the percent of teachers with low levels of experience.

It is useful to pull out two schools at the two ends of this distribution to further illustrate this point. Thirteen percent of students at Horn Elementary School are free or reduced lunch eligible. Horn's teachers tend to have much less seniority than the district average, only 13 percent of its teachers have five or fewer years experience and 30 percent of its teachers have MA's. On the other hand, 90 percent of students at Love Elementary School are free or reduced-lunch eligible, 83 percent of its teachers have five or fewer years experience, and only 4 percent have MA's. Give the Houston salary schedule, the average teacher salary at Love will be lower than at Horn. Of course, it may be that Title I, special education, or other compensatory funds offset this salary schedule effect. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the salary schedule tends to disequalize student expenditures in favor of relatively higher SES schools.

The inefficiencies associated with the single salary schedule identified above might be ameliorated if it were the case that the variables rewarded on the schedule -- experience and graduate credits -- had a strong relationship to student achievement gains. In fact, the research on the effect of these variables suggests that any positive relationships are modest at best. Teaching experience is associated with gains in student

achievement, but only for relatively low levels of experience, typically no more than five or so years. In fact, a recent study of Texas TAAS scores (Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin, 1998) found no significant positive effects of teaching experience beyond one year. The research on the effect of graduate credits or an MA is even more ambiguous. Most studies find no significant effects, and the number of studies finding a significant positive effect are offset by nearly equal numbers finding a significant negative effect (Ballou and Podgursky, 2001).

In considering the arguments against differentiated pay, it is important to keep in mind the three distinctions noted above. Some of the arguments against differentiated pay apply to some but not necessarily all of the dimensions of inflexibility noted above.

Let's begin with merit pay. In the wake of the Nation at Risk report in 1983, a number of school districts began limited experiments with merit pay. Most of these were short-lived. Case studies of districts that implemented merit pay were undertaken by Murnane and Cohen (1986), and Hatry, Greiner and Ashford (1994). Perhaps the strongest economic case against merit pay is made by Murnane and Cohen, who argue that teaching is not a field that lends itself to performance-based compensation methods. The objections to merit pay are:

1. **Difficulty in Monitoring Performance.** Teacher performance is difficult to monitor. Unlike, say, the sales of a salesman or the billable hours of a professional such as a doctor or lawyer, the output of teacher is not marketed and thus we cannot readily measure the value of the services provided by an individual teacher.
2. **Team Production.** Even if it were possible to accurately measure the value-added of a school, it is difficult or impossible to assign this value-added to particular teachers. To a considerable extent teachers work as members of a team. Introducing individual merit pay would reduce incentives for teachers to cooperate and overall performance of the school will suffer.
3. **Favoritism.** To the extent that merit pay systems involve subjective assessments of teacher performance by supervisors, it is possible that favoritism rather than objective assessment will taint the evaluations.
4. **Equity Between Schools.** Since merit assessments typically involve subjective assessments by supervisors, it is difficult to assure that assessment will be completely standardized across all schools. In other words, even if evaluations are undertaken as objectively as possible and without favoritism, it is possible that a teacher performing in the same manner would receive a different score in different schools. Since most collective bargaining agreements have provisions for filing grievances, this leaves districts open to grievances claiming that teachers have been treated differently in different schools. This problem of "horizontal equity" in evaluations seems to have been a factor in the demise of the highly-publicized merit pay plan in Cincinnati.

Some of these criticisms of merit pay apply to the other pay rigidities as well. For example, union representatives often cite variants of arguments 2 and 3 when objecting to bonuses or pay differences by field. They argue that because schools are teams, differences by field will undermine morale and team performance. For example, in a recent editorial in USA Today, former NEA president Bob Chase stated:

I'm all for a marketplace solution to the teacher shortage. But please don't distract us with ill-considered half measures, such as paying math and science teachers more than other teachers. We might as well hang a sign in the teachers' room saying "In this school, if you don't teach math or science your work is literally 'less valuable.' This is insulting -- and wrong..."

Instead of robbing Peter to pay Paul, we need to pay all teachers a competitive, professional salary. (Chase, 2002)

Union leaders sometimes argue as well that field pay differentials or merit differentials are unacceptable until the overall base level of funding for teacher pay is "adequate." However, from an economic point of view, the only way to define "adequate" is with reference to the external marketplace.

Note that these arguments do not apply to pay differences between schools. One might accept arguments 1-3 and still support higher pay for teachers who agree to work in low-performing schools. In fact, there is some evidence that teacher unions are relatively more willing to accept pay differentials for teaching in low-performing schools (Prince, 2002).

Experiments in Reform

A complete documentation of all of the current experiments in teacher pay reform is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, two recent papers provide excellent surveys of current developments (Prince, 2002; Hassel, 2002). It is apparent that while salary schedules are in place in virtually all public school districts, pressure for more market-based pay setting is making itself felt. This provides a brief list of some reforms.

1. Recruitment bonuses or incentives for teachers in shortage fields. Faced with severe shortages in special education and other teaching fields, a growing number of school districts are beginning to offer various types of bonuses or recruitment incentives. This is explicit in many cases. In Massachusetts, for example, the state introduced widely publicized \$20,000 bonuses for teachers in shortage fields with high quality academic credentials. Many districts seem to be offering bonuses of various sorts to recruits in shortage areas. This may take the form of explicit cash signing bonuses. Or it may take the more subtle form of starting new recruits on a higher step on the salary schedule. Data on these types of incentives were collected in the just-released 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Surveys (Table 3). Administrators were asked about the use of several types of bonuses. At the bottom of the table we report results for shortage field bonuses. Slightly more than ten percent of public school districts report using these

bonuses. These 10.3 percent of districts, however, account for 24.4 percent of public school students. (Unfortunately, the survey did not collect data on the size of the bonuses.)

2. Bonuses for Hard-to-Staff Schools. Several states and a number of urban districts are beginning to experiment with bonuses for teachers working in troubled schools. Recently, the New York City school district began providing 15 percent pay bonuses for teachers who taught in schools on probation. However, this 15 percent bonuses was tied to 15 percent more teacher contract hours in the school building (longer days and more days per year). The teacher union was still opposed to a separate schedule for these schools. The data in Table 2 show that some school districts are beginning to experiment with these types of differentials. Pressure on states and districts in the No Child Left Behind Act concerning "failing schools" is likely to increase these types of experiments.

3. Merit or Performance-Based Pay. This is probably one of the most contentious areas. Yet there remains interest in tying teacher compensation -- either individually or the school level or a mix of the two -- to measures of student performance. Districts are making increasingly sophisticated use of data on student achievement gains. As pressure on districts for student achievement gains grows it is likely that districts will begin to experiment with tying some part of teacher compensation to student achievement gains.

All of these experiments in more flexible teacher pay are likely to be accelerated by Title II of the No Child Left Behind Act, which appropriates \$3.175 billion in the current fiscal year to help states improve teacher quality by various means, including

Developing, or assisting local educational agencies in developing, merit-based performance systems, and strategies that provide differential and bonus pay for teachers in high need academic projects such as reading, mathematics, and science and teachers in high-poverty schools and districts. (quoted in Prince, 2002)

The same act also specifies that programs funded should be linked to measurable increases in student achievement.

Concluding Observations

Most southern states maintain state-wide minimum salary schedules (Tables 4 and 5). By default, these state-wide schedules become the actual schedules for many districts, and a form a benchmark for many more. However, I am unaware of any careful analysis or economic rationale justifying the structure of these schedules. Why does it take 29 years to reach the top of the North Carolina schedule but only 15 to top out in Tennessee? Why is the ratio of MA-max to MA-min. 180 percent in North Carolina, but only 152 percent in South Carolina, and 124 percent in Alabama?

Compensation policy is not something that is efficiently designed or implemented from state capitols. State-policy makers simply do not have adequate information to design the best compensation policy for hundreds of local districts and thousands of schools. In light of the inefficiencies associated with the single salary schedule, the best course of action for state policy-makers who seek to regulate wage-setting by local districts would be to limit their efforts to setting (and funding) competitive minimum starting pay for school teachers. How districts choose to structure their pay beyond starting salaries, and which teacher credentials or training is rewarded ought to be left to local school administrators.

In order to encourage more flexible pay setting by districts, states might set aside monies to assist districts that are willing to implement pay differentials by field, school or merit. This could be a competitive program open to districts that are willing to experiment. Districts that choose to stick with their traditional salary schedule would not get funded, whereas those who are willing to experiment would. Such a program might help change the culture surrounding wage-setting in K-12 education and encourage more innovative and entrepreneurial behavior on the part of school administrators. It may help encourage a more professional attitude among teachers as well.

References

Ballou, Dale. 2001. "Pay for Performance in Public and Private Schools." Economics of Education Review Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 51-61.

Dale Ballou and Michael Podgursky. 1997. Teacher Pay and Teacher Quality. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute.

Ballou, Dale and Michael Podgursky. 2000. "Reforming Teacher Preparation and Licensing: What Does the Evidence Show?" Teachers College Record Vol. 101, No. 1 (Winter), pp. 5-26.

Ballou, Dale and Michael Podgursky. 2002. "Returns to Seniority Among Public School Teachers." Journal of Human Resources. Vol. 37, No. 4 (Fall), forthcoming.

Chase, Bob. 2002. "No, pay all teachers well." USA Today. May 15, p. 10A.

Hanushek, Eric A, John F. Kain, Steven G. Rivkin, 1998. "Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement." NBER Working Paper 6691. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Hassel, Bryan C. 2002. Better Pay for Better Teaching: Making Teacher Compensation Pay Off in the Age of Accountability. Washington, DC: Progressive Policy Institute. http://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=110&subid=134&contentid=250543

Hatry, Harry P., John M. Greiner, and Brenda G. Ashford. 1994. Issues and Case Studies in Teacher Incentive Plans. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. 2/e.

Kershaw, Joseph A. and Roland N. McKean. 1962. Teacher Shortages and Salary Schedules. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lankford, Hamilton, and James Wyckoff. 1997. "The Changing Structure of Teacher Compensation, 1970-94." Economics of Education Review. Vol. 16. No. 4, pp. 371-384.

Lankford, Hamilton, Susanna Loeb, and James Wyckoff. 2002. "Teacher Sorting and the Plight of Urban Schools." Education Evaluation and Policy Analysis. Vol. 24. No. 1, pp. 37-62.

Lieberman, Myron. 1956. Education as a Profession. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Murnane, Richard J. and David K. Cohen. 1986. "Merit Pay and the Evaluation Problem: Why Most Merit Pay Plans Fail and a Few Survive." Harvard Education Review Vol. 56 No. 1 (February), pp. 1-17.

Murnane, Richard J., Judith D. Singer, and John B. Willett. 1987. "Changes in Teacher Salaries During the 1970's: The Role of School District Demographics." Economics of Education Review. Vol. 6. No. 4, pp. 379-388.

Prince, Cynthia D. 2002. "Higher Pay in Hard-to-Staff Schools: The Case for Financial Incentives." Arlington, VA: American Association of School Administrators.
http://www.aasa.org/issues_and_insights/issues_dept/higher_pay.pdf

Murphy, Marjorie. 1990. Blackboard Unions: The AFT and NEA 1900-1980. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Stinebrickner, Todd. 2001. "A Dynamic Model of Teacher Labor Supply." Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 19 No. 1 (January), pp. 196-230.

Table 1

2001-2002 Teacher Salary Schedule for the Houston
Independent School District

(This schedule does not reflect the additional \$500
service recognition stipend being paid separately to
teachers with 24 or more years of experience with
HISD.)

Ste	Experien	BACHELO	Ste	Experien	MASTE	Ste	Experien	DOCTORA
p	ce	RS	p	ce	RS	p	ce	TE
1	0	\$34,588	1	0	\$35,613	1	0	\$36,638
2	1	\$35,100	2	1	\$36,140	2	1	\$37,180
3	2	\$35,620	3	2	\$36,660	3	2	\$37,700
4	3	\$36,140	4	3	\$37,180	4	3	\$38,376
5	4-6	\$36,400	5	4-6	\$37,440	5	4-6	\$38,584
6	7-8	\$37,336	6	7-8	\$38,376	6	7-8	\$39,416
7	9	\$37,960	7	9	\$39,000	7	9	\$40,279
8	10	\$39,198	8	10	\$40,186	8	10	\$41,632
9	11-12	\$40,766	9	11	\$41,766	9	11	\$42,397
10	13-15	\$42,397	10	12	\$42,397	10	12	\$43,820
11	16-17	\$43,820	11	13-14	\$43,820	11	13-14	\$45,243
12	18-20	\$45,243	12	15-17	\$45,243	12	15	\$46,669
13	21-23	\$46,669	13	18-19	\$46,669	13	16-17	\$48,094
14	24-25	\$48,094	14	20-21	\$48,094	14	18-19	\$49,515
15	26-27	\$49,515	15	22-23	\$49,515	15	20-21	\$50,939
16	28	\$50,939	16	24-25	\$50,939	16	22-23	\$52,364
17	29+	\$52,882	17	26	\$52,364	17	24	\$53,787
			18	27	\$53,787	18	25	\$55,825
			19	28+	\$55,729	19	26+	\$58,578

Table 2

School Administrators' Assessment of Difficulty in Filling Vacant Teaching Positions

	How difficult or easy was it to fill the vacancies for this school year In each of the following fields?				
	(1) Easy	(2) Somewhat Difficult	(3) Very Difficult	(4) Could Not Fill the Vacancy	(5) (3)+(4)
Elementary Education	67.6%	26.2%	5.5%	0.7%	6.2%
Special Education	25.5%	35.8%	32.8%	5.8%	38.6%
Math	29.0%	34.8%	33.3%	2.8%	36.2%
Biological Science	34.0%	38.5%	26.2%	1.3%	27.5%
Physical Science	31.7%	35.7%	30.2%	2.4%	32.6%

Source: 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Surveys

Table 3

Use of Incentives by Public School Districts

<p>"Does this district currently use any pay incentives such as cash bonuses, salary increases, or different steps on the salary schedule to -"</p>		
<p>"Recruit or retain teachers to teach in a less desirable location"</p>		
	Percent of Districts	Student-Weighted Percent of Districts
Percent Yes	3.6%	11.7%
<p>"Does this district currently use any pay incentives to recruit or retain teachers to teach in fields of shortage?"</p>		
	Percent of Districts	Student-Weighted Percent of Districts
Percent Yes	10.4%	24.4%

Source: 1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Surveys

Table 4: State Minimum Salary Schedules for Teachers with Bachelor's Degrees
SREB States, 2000-01*

	Characteristics			Minimum mandated salary					
	Number of steps	Years of experience for top step	Salary variation from first step to top step	No experience	5 years of experience	10 years of experience	15 years of experience	20 years of experience	Top step of the schedule
Alabama	8	21	24%	\$28,678	\$31,545	\$33,367	\$33,943	\$35,197	\$35,646
Arkansas	16	15	30%	21,860	24,080	26,300	28,520	28,520	28,520
Delaware	10	9	26%	22,560	25,222	28,516	28,516	28,516	28,516
Georgia	13	19	46%	27,118	29,633	34,166	37,334	39,608	39,608
Kentucky	5	20	38%	19,910	22,580	25,950	26,950	27,450	27,450
Louisiana	26	25	56%	14,631	16,398	18,576	20,298	21,534	22,846
Mississippi	22	21	44%	23,040	25,215	27,390	29,565	31,740	33,175
North Carolina	30	29	80%	25,000	30,060	33,780	36,310	39,110	44,930
Oklahoma	26	25	34%	27,060	29,549	31,209	32,869	34,529	36,189
South Carolina	23	22	54%	24,255	27,457	30,804	34,128	36,536	37,270
Tennessee	16	15	17%	23,375	24,745	26,075	27,455	27,455	27,455
Texas	21	20	68%	24,240	28,380	33,730	37,760	40,800	40,800
West Virginia	14	13	28%	22,186	24,747	27,073	28,468	28,468	28,468

* SREB states without state minimum salary schedules include Florida, Maryland and Virginia.

Note: Figures in this table are taken from state minimum salary schedules and do not necessarily reflect actual salaries paid.

Source: Southern Regional Education Board

Table 5: State Minimum Salary Schedules for Teachers with Master's Degrees
SREB States, 2000-01*

	Characteristics			Minimum mandated salary					
	Number of steps	Years of experience for top step	Salary variation from first step to top step	No experience	5 years of experience	10 years of experience	15 years of experience	20 years of experience	Top step of the schedule
Alabama	8	21	24%	\$32,979	\$36,276	\$38,373	\$39,068	\$40,476	\$40,994
Arkansas	16	15	30%	25,139	27,689	30,239	32,789	32,789	32,789
Delaware	14	13	43%	25,718	28,087	33,434	36,705	36,705	36,705
Georgia	13	19	46%	31,186	34,079	39,292	42,936	45,551	45,551
Kentucky	5	20	33%	22,580	25,200	28,600	29,610	30,110	30,110
Louisiana	26	25	61%	14,984	16,930	19,689	21,479	22,787	24,174
Mississippi	26	25	59%	24,090	26,740	29,390	32,040	34,690	38,340
North Carolina	30	29	80%	27,500	33,070	37,160	39,940	43,020	49,420
Oklahoma	26	25	32%	28,166	30,655	32,315	33,975	35,635	37,295
South Carolina	23	22	52%	27,773	31,411	35,048	38,687	41,359	42,190
Tennessee	16	15	18%	25,040	26,545	28,030	29,530	29,530	29,530
Texas				Local decision **					
West Virginia	17	16	31%	24,629	27,190	29,516	32,306	32,306	32,306

* SREB states without state minimum salary schedules include Florida, Maryland and Virginia.

** The minimum salary schedule in Texas is for bachelor's degrees only. Any amount beyond the minimum is a local decision.

Note: Figures in this table are taken from state minimum salary schedules and do not necessarily reflect actual salaries paid.

Source: Southern Regional Education Board.

Figure 1: Teacher Salary Schedules in Traditional Public, Charter, and Private Schools




Figure 2

Percent of Teachers with Five or Fewer Years Teaching Experience
and Percent of Students Free and Reduced Lunch Eligible:

Elementary Schools, Houston Independent School District, 2001-2002

