The Political Consequences of Terrorism: Terror Events, Casualties, and Government Duration

Online Appendix

Overview

In this document we discuss in greater detail robustness checks discussed, though not presented in the manuscript.

Tabular Depiction of Empirical Results in the Manuscript

In the manuscript, we decided to follow the advice of Kastellec and Leoni (2007) and present our empirical results graphically rather than in tabular fashion. While we feel that it improves the inferences one can gleam from empirical results, we understand that some readers would rather view the results in tables. We present the Weibull regression models in Table A.1 and the appropriate marginal effects for interactive relationships in Table A.2.

[Tables A.1 and A.2 about here]

Peculiarities of Election Laws

In this section we present two additional robustness checks that incorporate variables in an attempt to control for the substantial variation in the sample countries with respect to the government's

ability to call elections at any time. The ability to call for early elections is an important component of the overall types of government termination, and is one that can be triggered by the opposition—via a successful no-confidence motion—or the government—via parliamentary dissolution. It is therefore important to control for varying levels of difficulty of parliamentary dissolution in these states. We see two strategies—in addition to the use of fixed effects in the manuscript—to deal with this heterogeneity.

The first method uses various insights from the literature on government termination (e.g., King et al. 1990; Warwick 1994; Lupia and Strom 1995; Diermeier and Stevenson 2000) and strategic parliamentary dissolution (e.g., Balke 1990; Strom and Swindle 2002; Smith 2003; Kayser 2005; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009) to produce a more complete model specification of government termination. This model specification includes innovations that can be grouped into three categories.

The first category represents the barriers to government formation, which are influential in preventing certain types of governments from taking office. We include the measure *investiture*, which is coded 1 if the state requires that a potential government demonstrate that it has majority support in parliament via an investiture requirement before taking office (Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 2000). Since this requirement will likely discourage some more unstable governments from forming, we anticipate that states with an investiture requirement will have governments that face a lower hazard of termination (Laver and Shepsle 1996).[1]

The second category of innovation addresses variations in the ease at which the opposition can pass a no-confidence motion. Two institutional rules combine to make it either more difficult or easier to remove the government. First, some states require that a no-confidence motion receive an absolute majority of parliament, rather than a relative majority of voting members of parliament, to

[1]Our theoretical expectations for the effects of *investiture* are different from other scholars (King et al. 1990; Warwick 1994), but for reasons related to the different start dates of government. Our source of government data (Woldendorp, Keman and Budge 2000) code the start date of a government as when it passes the investiture vote (if required), as opposed to the first formation effort.

pass. This presents a higher hurdle to removing the government, and produces the unique situation where a government can lose a no-confidence motion, but remain in government because the motion failed to garner an absolute majority.[2] Second, other states require that a no-confidence motion must be accompanied by an alternative government (Germany, Spain, Belgium after 1995). Thus, there must be a majority of members of parliament that not only agree to remove the government, but also agree on an alternative composition of government. Given the ideological complexity of parliament in these cases, it is obvious that this is a high hurdle to remove the opposition (Diermeier, Eraslan and Merlo 2002). Together, these two institutional rules make up what de Winter (1995) calls "positive resignation".

The third category of innovation incorporates the limits on the executive's ability to call elections whenever he/she finds favorable. Two research projects inform our understanding of these constraints. Strom and Swindle (2002) present a formal model of strategic election timing, derive some hypotheses, and then present an empirical test of these hypotheses. They find empirical evidence that parliamentary dissolution will be more likely when the head of state is either nonpartisan or powerless and less likely when the cabinet or parliament has to agree to dissolve. To control for these variations, we create two dummy variables: *powerless head of state* and *cabinet/parliamentary dissolution power*. The focus of Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) is the role of the executive in parliamentary dissolution across regime types (parliamentary, presidential, and mixed). They theorize that dissolution will be more likely when the executive has unilateral dissolution power and less likely when dissolution is "constrained" by veto players. We include the following variables: *PM dissolution* and *constrained dissolution*. The distribution of these institutional variations across the sample countries is displayed in Table A.3.[3]

[Tables A.3 and A.4 about here]

[2] In some instances, like the Barak government of Israel, there have been times when a majority has been in support of a no-confidence motion but the motion failed since it did not receive an absolute majority.

[3] We fill in missing data for the parliamentary dissolution measures from a number of sources, including Kurian (1997) and Strom, Muller and Bergman (2004).

In Table A.4 we provide the results of the Weibull regression models for Models 2-4 in the manuscript. We find that our key finding—that the effects of terrorism casualties depend on the government's partisanship—is robust to the inclusion of these institutional variables. Indeed, when we look at the marginal effects of these interactions in Table A.5 with all three indicators of terrorism (ITERATE, GTD, and TWEED), terrorism has a more destabilizing effect on left-wing governments than right-wing governments.

A number of the variables show that reducing the likelihood of parliamentary dissolution also reduces the possibility of government termination overall. Requiring an *investiture* vote reduces the risk of government termination, as does disallowing early parliamentary dissolution (*No dissolution*), placing dissolution powers in the hands of many veto players (*constrained dissolution*), or requiring that the cabinet or parliament approve of dissolution (*cabinet/parliamentary dissolution*), and limiting no-confidence motions to only *constructive votes*. The other results are contrary to our expectations: granting the PM unilateral dissolution powers (*PM dissolution*), and having a powerless head of state (*powerless head of state*) both unexpectedly decrease the risk of termination. Also unexpected was the effect of requiring an *absolute majority*, which increases the risk of termination.

Of course, these results must be interpreted with a couple of caveats in mind. First, all the actors in a system are aware of these institutional variations, and are likely to form governments that reflect these requirements. For example, countries that require an investiture vote or that have a constructive vote of no-confidence might spend more time in the government formation process, but likely will have more durable governments once they form. Thus, the variance in government duration that we observe is most likely a function of a set of strategic decisions made by elites. This selection process means that we are likely to see results that are weaker than they actually are (e.g., Signorino 1999; King, Keohane and Verba 1994).

Second, the studies by Strom and Swindle (2002) and Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009), as

helpful as they are, address only a subset of types of government termination. While this study focuses on all types of government termination (resignation of the PM, withdrawal of parliamentary support, change of coalition, parliamentary dissolution, etc), Strom and Swindle (2002) focus on parliamentary dissolution and Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) divide up terminations into dissolution and replacement. Since these studies are explaining different phenomena than we are, it is understandable that we would generate empirical results that differ from theirs. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009: 507) reveal "systematic evidence to suggest that constitutional rules do indeed give rise to some powerful substitution effects between early election calling and nonelectoral government replacements". This might explain why we see institutional rules have unexpected influence on government termination as a whole, compared to early parliamentary dissolution.

The previous set of models suggests that institutional rules may have different effects in different countries. Thus, there is the possibility that there are unique circumstances, historical legacies, common practices, election laws, etc, that are particular to each country. These institutional rules, for example, can only partially explain why Italy averages a new government every year, or why Japanese governments are much more likely to end due to resignation of the PM than other countries. These peculiarities do not lend themselves particularly well to variables intended to generalize these phenomena.

The fixed effects models in the manuscript partially address these concerns, but only to the extent that they allow each country to have a different underlying baseline hazard of government termination. Since it is possible that the effects of the electoral cycle may differ across each country, we estimate another model where we interact each of the country-specific dummy variables with *time left in CIEP*. This relaxes the assumption that all actors in each country respond similarly to different stages of the election cycle. If these interaction variables are statistically significant, this would support the idea that the effects of the electoral cycle are statistically different from each other across countries. We present replications of Models 2-4 in Table A.6.

[Tables A.6 and A.7 about here]

The results suggest that the primary empirical finding of the manuscript is also robust to the improved model specification. In some cases, the conditional effect of partisanship increases (i.e., Model 4 in Table A.7. When these two sets of robustness checks are combined with the fixed effects models in the manuscript, we can be confident that the partisanship effects of terrorism are robust to changes in model specification to account for the peculiarities of election laws.

Measures of Terrorism

Table A.8 provides the results replicating Models 1 and 2 in the manuscript with a six-month moving average of the total number of incidents and the total number of casualties from terrorism (ITERATE). Table A.9 provides the marginal effects for the interactive relationships in Models 1 and 2.

[Tables A.8 and A.9 about here]

Estimation Technique

Table A.10 employs a new estimation technique. Much like the Weibull regression model, the Cox regression model predicts the time until an event occurs, given that the event has not occurred until that point. The two models differ in that the Cox regression model does not demand a particular distribution for the underlying hazard rate of government termination. In the manuscript we describe our theoretical and empirical justification for employing a Weibull model rather than a Cox. Since the data set includes variables that change in value over the course of the government (and across government-month observation), there is a possibility that we violate the proportional hazards assumption of the Cox model (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). To correct for

non-proportional hazards, we include interactions of each time-varying covariate with the government's tenure. If the assumption of proportional hazards is not violated then the interaction term between that covariate and time should not be significantly different from zero. If the proportional hazards assumption is violated then the interaction between time and the covariate should correct for non-proportionality.

[Tables A.10-A.12 about here]

Table A.10 replicates the three-month moving average of terrorist events in Models 1-2 with a Cox regression model, Table A.11 replicates the six-month moving average of terrorist events in Models 1-2, and Table A.12 provides the marginal effects for those models.

Samples and Summary Statistics

In Tables A.13-A.18 we present the samples and summary statistics for Models 1-2 (ITERATE), Model 3 (GTD), and Model 4 (TWEED) in the manuscript.

Tables & Figures

Table A.1: Weibull Regression Results of the Interactive Relationship between Terrorism, Partisanship, and Government Duration

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Total Killed (MA)	0.009	0.03*	0.03*	0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.02)
Number of Incidents (MA)	0.17	0.15	-0.006	0.03
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.018)	(0.07)
Partisanship	-0.007*	-0.006	-0.008*	0.0007
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Total Killed×Partisanship		-0.002*	-0.001†	-0.002**
		(0.001)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)
Time Left in CIEP	0.06**	0.06**	0.05**	0.07**
	(0.009)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Majority	0.69	0.70	0.82	2.05*
	(0.73)	(0.73)	(0.81)	(1.20)
CIEP×Majority	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.017†	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.015)
Government Parties	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.12)
Investiture	-0.12	-0.0006	-0.07	0.58
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.60)	(0.40)
GDP Per Capita	-0.00002*	-0.00002*	-0.00001	-0.00004*
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Constant	-4.82**	-4.83**	-4.82**	-6.93**
	(0.79)	(0.80)	(0.90)	(1.24)
N	7550	7550	6592	4918
ln_p	0.97**	0.97**	0.95**	0.97**

Note: Country fixed effects are omitted for presentation purposes.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.2: Marginal Effects of the Interactive Relationships in Shown in Table A.1

Conditioning Variable (Z)	$\beta_X + (\beta_{X \times Z} \times Z)$	95% CI
Model 1		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.06**	[0.04, 0.07]
Majority = 1	0.04**	[0.03, 0.05]
Model 2		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.06**	[0.04, 0.07]
Majority = 1	0.04**	[0.03, 0.05]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.08†	[-0.005, 0.17]
Partisanship = -10	0.05†	[-0.003, 0.10]
Partisanship = 0	0.03†	[-0.004, 0.06]
Partisanship = 10	0.01	[-0.009, 0.03]
Partisanship = 30	-0.02	[-0.06, 0.01]
Model 3		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.05**	[0.03, 0.07]
Majority = 1	0.04**	[0.03, 0.05]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.07	[-0.02, 0.16]
Partisanship = -10	0.04†	[-0.008, 0.09]
Partisanship = 0	0.03†	[-0.003, 0.06]
Partisanship = 10	0.01†	[-0.003, 0.04]
Partisanship = 30	-0.009	[-0.04, 0.03]
Model 4		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.07**	[0.05, 0.10]
Majority = 1	0.04**	[0.03, 0.05]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.13**	[0.07, 0.19]
Partisanship = -10	0.08**	[0.04, 0.12]
Partisanship = 0	0.06**	[0.02, 0.10]
Partisanship = 10	0.04†	[-0.003, 0.08]
Partisanship = 30	-0.008	[-0.07, 0.05]

Note: The first column displays the value of the conditioning variable while the second column provides the variable of interest (in italics) and the marginal effect. The 95% confidence intervals are shown in the third column (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). Since these are time-varying covariates, these marginal effects are when $t = 0$.

**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.3: Institutional Variations in Parliamentary Dissolution Powers

	Investiture	No Diss.	PM Diss.	Constrained Diss.	Cabinet/Parl.	Powerless HoS	Abs. Majority	Constructive
Australia			X			X		
Austria					X	X		
Belgium -1995								
Belgium 1995-2003					X		X	X
Canada			X			X		
Denmark			X			X		
France					X		X	
Germany	X			X			X	X
Great Britain			X			X		
Greece	X						X	
Iceland					X		X	
Ireland	X		X					
Israel	X			X		X	X	
Italy	X				X			
Japan				X		X		
Netherlands								
New Zealand			X			X		
Norway		X						
Portugal	X						X	
Spain	X		X				X	X
Sweden	X		X			X	X	

Table A.6: Weibull Regression Results of the Interactive Relationship between Terrorism, Partisanship, and Government Duration: Controlling for Institutional Variations in Parliamentary Dissolution Powers and Election Cycles

	Model 2	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Total Killed (MA)	0.04*	0.03*	0.06**
	(0.018)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of Incidents (MA)	0.18	-0.006	0.15
	(0.12)	(0.02)	(0.11)
Partisanship	-0.005	-0.007*	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Total Killed×Partisanship	-0.002*	-0.002†	-0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Time Left in CIEP	0.04†	0.06*	0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Majority	0.01	0.28	0.48
	(0.85)	(0.93)	(1.30)
CIEP×Majority	-0.009	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Government Parties	0.04	0.07	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)
Investiture	-0.88	0.30	-2.47
	(1.43)	(1.62)	(2.55)
Canada×CIEP	0.01	0.004	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Great Britain×CIEP	-0.04	-0.04	-0.11**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Ireland×CIEP	0.04	0.009	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Netherlands×CIEP	0.03	0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Belgium×CIEP	0.02	0.002	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
France×CIEP	-0.004	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Spain×CIEP	0.07*	0.06	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)

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Table A.6 – Continued

	Model 2	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Portugal×CIEP	0.01	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Germany×CIEP	0.05*	0.03	-0.005
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Austria×CIEP	0.02	0.01	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Italy×CIEP	-0.01	-0.04	-0.07*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Greece×CIEP	-0.03	0.03	-0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Sweden×CIEP	0.06*	0.03	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Norway×CIEP	0.02	-0.004	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Denmark×CIEP	-0.03	-0.04	
	(0.03)	(0.03)	
Iceland×CIEP		0.03	
		(0.03)	
Israel×CIEP	0.02	-0.005	
	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Japan×CIEP	-0.02	-0.04*	
	(0.02)	(0.02)	
Australia×CIEP		-0.02	
		(0.03)	
GDP Per Capita	-0.00002*	-0.00001	-0.00004*
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Constant	-3.36*	-4.52**	-5.39**
	(1.51)	(1.63)	(1.64)
N	7550	6592	4918
ln_p	0.86**	0.86**	0.89**

Note: Country fixed effects are omitted for presentation purposes.
Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden are the reference categories
for Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.4: Weibull Regression Results of the Interactive Relationship between Terrorism, Partisanship, and Government Duration: Controlling for Institutional Variations in Parliamentary Dissolution Powers

	Model 2	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Total Killed (MA)	0.04*	0.04*	0.06**
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Number of Incidents (MA)	0.14	-0.008	0.03
	(0.12)	(0.018)	(0.07)
Partisanship	-0.008*	-0.01*	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Total Killed×Partisanship	-0.002*	-0.002†	-0.04*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.02)
Time Left in CIEP	0.06**	0.06**	0.08**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Majority	0.79	0.88	2.30**
	(0.75)	(0.85)	(1.26)
CIEP×Majority	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Government Parties	0.07	0.09	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.13)
Investiture	-3.67**	-2.87**	-5.30**
	(0.82)	(0.61)	(1.36)
No Dissolution	-6.49**	-6.13**	
	(0.96)	(1.01)	
PM Dissolution	-2.06**	-1.94**	-2.22**
	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.40)
Constrained Dissolution	-1.62**	-1.52**	-3.49**
	(0.48)	(0.54)	(0.80)
Cabinet/Parliamentary Dissolution	-2.82**	-2.18**	-2.76**
	(0.77)	(0.59)	(0.77)
Powerless Head of State	-3.94**	-3.78**	-3.81**
	(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.66)
Absolute Majority	3.20**	2.41**	3.36**
	(0.67)	(0.58)	(0.68)
Constructive Vote	-1.22**	-14.91**	-1.03**
	(0.26)	(0.93)	(0.27)
GDP Per Capita	-0.00002*	-0.00001	-0.00004**
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Constant	1.05	0.82	-0.70
	(1.05)	(1.13)	(1.69)
N	7550	6592	4918
ln_p	0.98**	0.97**	1.02**

Note: Country fixed effects are omitted for presentation purposes.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.5: Marginal Effects of the Interactive Relationships in Shown in Table A.4

Conditioning Variable (Z)	$\beta_X + (\beta_{X \times Z} \times Z)$	95% CI
Model 2		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.06**	[0.04, 0.08]
Majority = 1	0.04**	[0.03, 0.05]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.11**	[0.01, 0.20]
Partisanship = -10	0.06**	[0.007, 0.11]
Partisanship = 0	0.04*	[0.003, 0.07]
Partisanship = 10	0.01	[-0.007, 0.04]
Partisanship = 30	-0.03	[-0.07, 0.01]
Model 3		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.06**	[0.03, 0.08]
Majority = 1	0.04**	[0.03, 0.05]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.08†	[-0.01, 0.18]
Partisanship = -10	0.05†	[-0.001, 0.10]
Partisanship = 0	0.04*	[0.002, 0.07]
Partisanship = 10	0.02†	[-0.001, 0.04]
Partisanship = 30	-0.01	[-0.05, 0.03]
Model 4		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.08**	[0.05, 0.11]
Majority = 1	0.04**	[0.03, 0.05]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.13**	[0.06, 0.19]
Partisanship = -10	0.08**	[0.04, 0.12]
Partisanship = 0	0.06**	[0.02, 0.10]
Partisanship = 10	0.04**	[0.0001, 0.08]
Partisanship = 30	-0.01	[-0.06, 0.06]

Note: The first column displays the value of the conditioning variable while the second column provides the variable of interest (in italics) and the marginal effect. The 95% confidence intervals are shown in the third column (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006).

**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.7: Marginal Effects of the Interactive Relationships in Shown in Table A.6

Conditioning Variable (Z)	$\beta_X + (\beta_{X \times Z} \times Z)$	95% CI
Model 2		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.04	[-0.008, 0.08]
Majority = 1	0.03	[-0.01, 0.07]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.11**	[0.004, 0.21]
Partisanship = -10	0.06**	[0.003, 0.11]
Partisanship = 0	0.04†	[-0.0001, 0.07]
Partisanship = 10	0.01	[-0.01, 0.03]
Partisanship = 30	-0.04	[-0.09, 0.01]
Model 3		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.06*	[0.008, 0.10]
Majority = 1	0.04*	[0.004, 0.08]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.09†	[-0.02, 0.20]
Partisanship = -10	0.05†	[-0.01, 0.12]
Partisanship = 0	0.03†	[-0.004, 0.07]
Partisanship = 10	0.02	[-0.005, 0.04]
Partisanship = 30	-0.02	[-0.07, 0.03]
Model 4		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.09**	[0.05, 0.13]
Majority = 1	0.08**	[0.03, 0.14]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.19**	[0.12, 0.25]
Partisanship = -10	0.10**	[0.07, 0.13]
Partisanship = 0	0.06**	[0.03, 0.09]
Partisanship = 10	0.017	[-0.03, 0.07]
Partisanship = 30	-0.07	[-0.16, 0.02]

Note: The first column displays the value of the conditioning variable while the second column provides the variable of interest (in italics) and the marginal effect. The 95% confidence intervals are shown in the third column (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006).

**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.8: Weibull Regression Results of the Interactive Relationship between Terrorism (ITER-ATE, 6-Month Moving Average), Partisanship, and Government Duration

	Model 1	**Model 2**
Total Killed (MA)	-0.0007	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.04)
Number of Incidents (MA)	0.246†	0.15
	(0.14)	(0.12)
Partisanship	-0.007†	-0.006†
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Total Killed$\times$Partisanship		-0.002†
		(0.001)
Time Left in CIEP	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.009)	(0.01)
Majority	0.77	0.79
	(0.74)	(0.74)
CIEP$\times$Majority	-0.018*	-0.018*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Government Parties	0.06	0.05
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Investiture	-0.007	0.04
	(0.497)	(0.50)
GDP Per Capita	-0.00002*	-0.00002*
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Constant	-4.92**	-4.90**
	(0.80)	(0.81)
N	7498	7498
ln_p	0.97**	0.97**

Note: Country fixed effects are omitted for presentation purposes.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.9: Marginal Effects of the Interactive Relationships in Shown in Table A.8

Conditioning Variable (Z)	$\beta_X + (\beta_{X \times Z} \times Z)$	95% CI
Model 1		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.06*	[0.04, 0.08]
Majority = 1	0.04*	[0.03, 0.05]
Model 2		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.06*	[0.04, 0.08]
Majority = 1	0.04*	[0.03, 0.05]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.097†	[-0.06, 0.25]
Partisanship = -10	0.05	[-0.08, 0.22]
Partisanship = 0	0.03	[-0.05, 0.11]
Partisanship = 10	0.006	[-0.05, 0.06]
Partisanship = 30	-0.04	[-0.10, 0.02]

Note: The first column displays the value of the conditioning variable while the second column provides the variable of interest (in italics) and the marginal effect. The 95% confidence intervals are shown in the third column (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006).

**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.10: Cox Regression Results of the Interactive Relationship between Terrorism (ITERATE, 3-Month Moving Average), Partisanship, and Government Duration

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
	β	$\beta \times t$	β	$\beta \times t$
Total Killed (MA)	0.10*	-0.10*	0.10*	-0.09†
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Number of Incidents (MA)	0.0001	0.09	-0.019	0.09
	(0.18)	(0.065)	(0.19)	(0.07)
Partisanship	-0.015*	0.005†	-0.01*	0.005†
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Total Killed× Partisanship			-0.0008	
			(0.001)	
Time Left in CIEP	0.02*	0.014**	0.02*	0.014**
	(0.01)	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.003)
Majority	0.74		0.74	
	(0.62)		(0.62)	
CIEP× Majority	-0.014†	-0.004*	-0.014†	-0.004*
	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.002)
Government Parties	0.073		0.071	
	(0.065)		(0.065)	
Investiture	0.001		0.016	
	(0.45)		(0.45)	
GDP Per Capita	-0.00006*	0.00002*	-0.00006*	0.00002*
	(0.00002)	(0.00001)	(0.00002)	(0.00001)
N	7550		7550	

Note: Country fixed effects are omitted for presentation purposes.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.11: Cox Regression Results of the Interactive Relationship between Terrorism (ITERATE, 6-Month Moving Average), Partisanship, and Government Duration

	Model 1		**Model 2**	
	β	$\beta \times t$	β	$\beta \times t$
Total Killed (MA)	0.17*	-0.19**	0.17*	-0.19*
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Number of Incidents (MA)	0.06	0.13*	0.06	0.13*
	(0.21)	(0.078)	(0.22)	(0.08)
Partisanship	-0.013*	0.004	-0.013*	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Total Killed× Partisanship			-0.0003	
			(0.008)	
Time Left in CIEP	0.02*	0.014**	0.021*	0.014**
	(0.01)	(0.003)	(0.01)	(0.003)
Majority	0.87		0.87	
	(0.63)		(0.63)	
CIEP× Majority	-0.016*	-0.004*	-0.16*	-0.004*
	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.002)
Government Parties	0.07		0.07	
	(0.064)		(0.064)	
Investiture	-0.009		-0.002	
	(0.45)		(0.45)	
GDP Per Capita	-0.00006**	0.00002*	-0.00006*	-0.00002*
	(0.00002)	(0.00001)	(0.00002)	(0.00001)
N	7498		7498	

Note: Country fixed effects are omitted for presentation purposes.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.12: Marginal Effects of the Interactive Relationships in Shown in Tables A.10 and A.11

Conditioning Variable (Z)	$\beta_X + (\beta_{X \times Z} \times Z)$	95% CI
Model 1 (3-Month)		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.02†	[-0.001, 0.04]
Majority = 1	0.006	[-0.01, 0.02]
Model 2 (3-Month)		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.02†	[-0.001, 0.04]
Majority = 1	0.006	[-0.01, 0.02]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.13*	[0.04, 0.21]
Partisanship = -10	0.11*	[0.03, 0.19]
Partisanship = 0	0.10*	[0.02, 0.18]
Partisanship = 10	0.09*	[0.002, 0.18]
Partisanship = 30	0.08	[-0.05, 0.20]
Model 1 (6-Month)		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.02†	[-0.002, 0.04]
Majority = 1	-0.0005	[-0.03, 0.03]
Model 2 (6-Month)		
	CIEP	
Majority = 0	0.02†	[-0.001, 0.04]
Majority = 1	0.005	[-0.01, 0.02]
	Total Killed	
Partisanship = -30	0.18†	[-0.005, 0.37]
Partisanship = -10	0.18*	[0.03, 0.32]
Partisanship = 0	0.17*	[0.03, 0.31]
Partisanship = 10	0.17*	[0.02, 0.32]
Partisanship = 30	0.16†	[-0.03, 0.35]

Note: The first column displays the value of the conditioning variable while the second column provides the variable of interest (in italics) and the marginal effect. The 95% confidence intervals are shown in the third column (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). Since these are time-varying covariates, these marginal effects are when $t = 0$.

**: p-value $< .01$, *: p-value $< .05$, †: p-value $< .10$, one-tailed.

Table A.13: Sample Countries: Models 1 and 2

	Start Date	No. of Obs. with Terrorism	No. of Obs. with Casualties	Total Obs.
Australia	1968m4	106	9	441
Austria	1968m4	184	35	436
Belgium	1968m4	185	45	426
Canada	1968m4	105	21	442
Denmark	1968m4	84	6	445
France	1968m4	327	179	440
Germany	1970m1	323	114	413
Great Britain	1968m4	328	133	439
Greece	1975m2	236	83	352
Ireland	1968m4	118	31	442
Israel	1968m4	312	205	431
Italy	1968m4	282	87	436
Japan	1968m4	118	7	452
Netherlands	1968m4	156	36	425
Norway	1968m4	43	4	445
Portugal	1976m10	84	15	318
Spain	1977m10	188	67	323
Sweden	1968m4	108	21	444
Total		**3,287**	**1,098**	**7,550**

Note: Since the unit of analysis is the government-month, the months that experience a government change have more than one observation. The time period listed excludes caretaker governments and non-partisan governments. Most countries enter the sample in the fourth month due to the three-month moving averages. Other differences in the time periods result from either the date of the first democratic election (i.e., Greece, Portugal, and Spain) or the availability of economic data (Germany pre-1970). The end date for all countries is 2003, which is determined by the availability of the ITERATE data. The terrorism variables represent the number of months with non-zero values of the moving average of total killed, so it does not necessarily mean the number of months with casualties resulting from terrorism.

Table A.14: Sample Countries: Model 3

	Start Date	**No. of Obs. with Terrorism**	**No. of Obs. with Casualties**	**Total Obs.**
Australia	1970m4	107	32	344
Austria	1970m4	149	31	343
Belgium	1970m4	151	56	335
Canada	1970m4	74	24	343
Denmark	1970m4	75	13	348
France	1970m4	304	198	344
Germany	1970m4	88	42	337
Great Britain	1970m4	272	144	343
Greece	1975m2	249	114	280
Iceland	1970m4	16	6	339
Ireland	1970m4	210	147	345
Israel	1970m4	276	248	343
Italy	1970m4	278	157	334
Japan	1970m4	219	45	352
Netherlands	1970m4	158	35	327
New Zealand	1970m4	24	3	344
Norway	1970m4	34	6	348
Portugal	1976m10	113	49	246
Spain	1977m10	240	235	251
Sweden	1970m4	74	24	346
Total		**3,111**	**1,609**	**6,592**

Note: Since the unit of analysis is the government-month, the months that experience a government change have more than one observation. The time period listed excludes caretaker governments and non-partisan governments. Most countries enter the sample in the fourth month due to the three-month moving averages. Other differences in the time periods result from either the date of the first democratic election (i.e., Greece, Portugal, and Spain) or the availability of economic data (Germany pre-1970). The end date for all countries is 1998, which is determined by the availability of the GTD data. The terrorism variables represent the number of months with non-zero values of the moving average of total killed, so it does not necessarily mean the number of months with casualties resulting from terrorism.

Table A.15: Sample Countries: Model 4

	Start Date	**No. of Obs. with Terrorism**	**No. of Obs. with Casualties**	**Total Obs.**
Austria	1968m1	24	6	439
Belgium	1968m1	68	33	429
France	1968m1	250	127	443
Germany	1970m1	199	94	413
Great Britain	1968m1	389	329	442
Greece	1975m2	150	61	352
Ireland	1968m1	63	30	445
Italy	1968m1	250	266	439
Netherlands	1968m1	59	18	428
Portugal	1976m10	56	29	318
Spain	1977m10	300	262	323
Sweden	1968m1	13	6	447
Total		**1,821**	**1,161**	**4,918**

Note: Since the unit of analysis is the government-month, the months that experience a government change have more than one observation. The time period listed excludes caretaker governments and non-partisan governments. Most countries enter the sample in the fourth month due to the three-month moving averages. Other differences in the time periods result from either the date of the first democratic election (i.e., Greece, Portugal, and Spain) or the availability of economic data (Germany pre-1970). The end date for all countries is 2003, which is determined by the availability of the TWEED data. The terrorism variables represent the number of months with non-zero values of the moving average of total killed, so it does not necessarily mean the number of months with casualties resulting from terrorism.

Table A.16: Descriptive Statistics: Models 1 and 2

	Min.	**Max.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Mode**
Total Killed (MA)	0	110.3	0.34	3.19	
Terrorist Incidents (MA)	0	5.33	0.36	0.63	
Time Left in CIEP	0	100	58.04	27.29	
Majority	0	1			1
No. of Government Parties	1	9	2.19	1.54	
Investiture	0	1			0
Government Partisanship	-54.3	48.46	-0.94	17.78	
Real GDP Per Capita	1856.83	34528.05	13568.5	7557.12	

Table A.17: Descriptive Statistics: Model 3

	Min.	**Max.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Mode**
Total Killed (MA)	0	109.67	0.64	3.61	
Terrorist Incidents (MA)	0	42	1.42	3.64	
Time Left in CIEP	0	100	58.18	27.22	
Majority	0	1			1
No. of Government Parties	1	9	2.10	1.47	
Investiture	0	1			0
Government Partisanship	-54.3	61.07	-0.73	18.91	
Real GDP Per Capita	2173.31	26934.4	11804.12	5763.20	

Table A.18: Descriptive Statistics: Model 4

	Min.	**Max.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Mode**
Total Killed (MA)	0	31	0.53	2.02	
Terrorist Incidents (MA)	0	18.67	0.51	1.34	
Time Left in CIEP	0	100	58.26	27.32	
Majority	0	1			1
No. of Government Parties	1	6	2.10	1.31	
Investiture	0	1			0
Government Partisanship	-54.3	34.5	-1.66	17.30	
Real GDP Per Capita	1856.83	29721.78	13095.44	7254.12	

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